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Intermediate

The Middle East: Alliances Without Friendship

Day 1: Why Did the UAE Open the Door to Israel?

中東：友情なき同盟 ― 第1日：UAEはなぜイスラエルに扉を開いたのか

29 September 2026

Two empty armchairs facing each other in a private meeting room overlooking the Abu Dhabi skyline at dusk

In late September 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly made a secret visit to Abu Dhabi. According to media reports, he asked UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed to deny an allegation that the Emirati leader had warned him about a possible Hamas attack shortly before October 7, 2023. Netanyahu denies receiving such a warning, and the claim remains disputed. Yet the episode reveals something important: Israel and the UAE now have a direct channel between their leaders.

2026年9月下旬、イスラエルのベンヤミン・ネタニヤフ首相がアブダビを極秘訪問したと報じられました。報道によれば、彼はUAEのムハンマド・ビン・ザイド大統領に対し、2023年10月7日の直前にこのUAE指導者がハマスによる攻撃の可能性について彼に警告していたという主張を否定するよう求めました。ネタニヤフ氏はそのような警告を受けたことを否定しており、この主張は依然として争われています。それでもこの出来事は重要なことを明らかにしています。イスラエルとUAEには今、指導者どうしの直接のルートがあるということです。

That relationship is relatively new. In 2020, the UAE became the first Gulf Arab country to normalize relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords. Israel agreed to suspend its planned annexation of parts of the occupied West Bank. The agreement surprised many observers because Arab governments had traditionally said that Israel should first resolve the Palestinian issue before receiving normal diplomatic relations.

その関係は比較的新しいものです。2020年、UAEはアブラハム合意の下でイスラエルと国交を正常化した最初の湾岸アラブ諸国になりました。イスラエルは、占領下のヨルダン川西岸の一部について計画していた併合を停止することに同意しました。この合意は多くの観察者を驚かせました。アラブ諸国の政府は伝統的に、イスラエルが正常な外交関係を得る前に、まずパレスチナ問題を解決すべきだと述べてきたからです。

Why did the UAE change course? One reason was economic opportunity. Israel offered advanced technology in areas such as cybersecurity, agriculture, water management, medicine, and artificial intelligence. The UAE offered investment, access to Gulf markets, and a major international business center in Dubai. Tourism, direct flights, trade, and a free-trade agreement created additional incentives for both sides.

UAEはなぜ方針を変えたのでしょうか？一つの理由は経済的な機会でした。イスラエルはサイバーセキュリティ、農業、水管理、医療、人工知能などの分野で先進技術を提供しました。UAEは投資、湾岸市場へのアクセス、そしてドバイという主要な国際ビジネス拠点を提供しました。観光、直行便、貿易、自由貿易協定が、双方にさらなる動機を生み出しました。

Security was another important factor. The UAE and Israel were both concerned about Iran’s regional influence, missile program, and support for armed groups. Israel also had intelligence and defense technology that interested the UAE. From Abu Dhabi’s perspective, cooperation with Israel could strengthen its relationship with the United States and improve its ability to respond to regional threats. It was a pragmatic partnership based on shared concerns, not a sudden discovery of common values.

安全保障も重要な要因でした。UAEとイスラエルはともに、イランの地域的影響力、ミサイル計画、武装勢力への支援を懸念していました。イスラエルはまた、UAEが関心を持つ情報と防衛技術を持っていました。アブダビの視点から見れば、イスラエルとの協力はアメリカとの関係を強め、地域の脅威に対応する能力を高めることができました。それは共通の懸念に基づく現実的な協力関係であり、共通の価値観を突然発見したものではありませんでした。

However, the UAE did not simply choose Israel and permanently reject Iran. For years, Iran was also an important trading partner, and the two countries share the waters of the Gulf. The UAE therefore tried to hedge: it strengthened security ties with the United States and Israel while keeping diplomatic and commercial connections with Tehran. The war that began in 2026 has severely damaged that balance, showing how difficult it is for a smaller state to maintain relations with competing powers.

しかしUAEは、単にイスラエルを選んでイランを永久に拒絶したわけではありません。長年、イランも重要な貿易相手であり、両国は湾の海を共有しています。そのためUAEはリスクを分散しようとしました。アメリカやイスラエルとの安全保障上の結びつきを強める一方で、テヘランとの外交的・商業的なつながりを保ったのです。2026年に始まった戦争はそのバランスに深刻な損害を与え、小さな国が競い合う大国との関係を維持するのがいかに難しいかを示しています。

The Palestinian issue has not disappeared either. The UAE argued that the 2020 agreement helped stop immediate Israeli annexation of West Bank territory. Since then, however, the Gaza war and Israeli settlement policies have placed the relationship under pressure. Emirati officials have described further annexation as a red line. Government cooperation with Israel does not mean that Emirati or wider Arab public opinion accepts Israeli policies toward Palestinians.

パレスチナ問題も消えたわけではありません。UAEは、2020年の合意がイスラエルによる西岸地区の即時併合を止めるのに役立ったと主張しました。しかしその後、ガザ戦争とイスラエルの入植政策が関係に圧力をかけてきました。UAE当局者は、さらなる併合を越えてはならない一線だと述べています。政府がイスラエルと協力しているからといって、UAEやより広いアラブの世論がパレスチナ人に対するイスラエルの政策を受け入れているわけではありません。

The UAE-Israel relationship has so far managed to withstand serious disagreements because both governments still see practical value in it. Normalization gives the UAE access, influence, and a way to speak directly to Israeli leaders. It gives Israel economic opportunities and greater acceptance in the Arab world. This is not necessarily friendship. It is an example of how two governments can cooperate because their interests overlap, even when their societies and political positions remain far apart.

UAEとイスラエルの関係がこれまで深刻な意見の相違に耐えてこられたのは、両政府がいまだにそこに実際的な価値を見いだしているからです。国交正常化はUAEに、アクセス、影響力、そしてイスラエルの指導者と直接話す手段を与えます。イスラエルには経済的な機会と、アラブ世界でのより大きな受容を与えます。これは必ずしも友情ではありません。社会や政治的立場が大きく離れたままでも、利害が重なるために二つの政府が協力できることを示す一例なのです。

Vocabulary

  1. allegation — a claim that someone has done something wrong, which has not yet been proved. Example: The company denied the allegation that it had hidden important safety information.
  2. direct channel — a way for two people, organizations, or governments to communicate with each other without using an intermediary. Example: The two military leaders created a direct channel to prevent misunderstandings during the crisis.
  3. normalize relations — to establish or restore regular diplomatic, political, or economic relations between countries. Example: The neighboring countries agreed to normalize relations after decades of hostility.
  4. annexation — the act of taking control of another territory and formally claiming it as part of a country. Example: The international community refused to recognize the annexation of the territory.
  5. incentive — something that encourages a person, company, or government to take a particular action. Example: Tax reductions can provide an incentive for companies to invest in clean energy.
  6. pragmatic — dealing with a situation in a practical way rather than following only principles or emotions. Example: The government adopted a pragmatic approach to working with its former rival.
  7. hedge — to reduce risk by keeping more than one option or relationship available. Example: The company opened factories in several countries to hedge against supply disruptions.
  8. red line — a limit that must not be crossed without causing serious consequences. Example: The minister said that attacks on civilian hospitals would be a red line.
  9. withstand — to remain strong or continue to exist despite pressure, damage, or difficulty. Example: The bridge was designed to withstand powerful earthquakes.

Comprehension Questions

  1. What does the reported secret visit illustrate, even though the warning allegation remains disputed?
    1. The UAE has ended all contact with Israel.
    2. Israel and the UAE now have direct communication at the highest level.
    3. The UAE officially supports every Israeli military action.
    4. Netanyahu has accepted responsibility for the October 7 attack.

    警告をめぐる主張がまだ争われているにもかかわらず、報じられた極秘訪問は何を示していますか？

  2. What happened under the 2020 Abraham Accords?
    1. The UAE and Iran ended diplomatic relations permanently.
    2. Israel created an independent Palestinian state.
    3. The UAE normalized relations with Israel, and Israel suspended a planned annexation.
    4. All Arab states established diplomatic relations with Israel.

    2020年のアブラハム合意の下で何が起きましたか？

  3. Which of the following best explains why the UAE normalized relations with Israel?
    1. The UAE had no economic relationship with other countries.
    2. The UAE wanted to replace the United States as Israel’s main ally.
    3. The UAE believed that the Palestinian issue had been completely solved.
    4. Economic, technological, security, and diplomatic interests supported cooperation.

    UAEがイスラエルと国交を正常化した理由を最もよく説明しているのはどれですか？

  4. What does the article mean when it says that the UAE tried to “hedge”?
    1. It built closer ties with Israel and the United States while also maintaining connections with Iran.
    2. It refused to communicate with any major power.
    3. It allowed Israel to make all its foreign-policy decisions.
    4. It ended trade with both Israel and Iran.

    記事がUAEは「リスクを分散（hedge）」しようとしたと言うとき、それはどういう意味ですか？

  5. What is the main argument of the article?
    1. Diplomatic normalization always creates friendship between countries.
    2. The UAE normalized relations only because it feared Iran.
    3. Governments can cooperate for practical reasons without agreeing on every political issue.
    4. The Abraham Accords ended disagreement over the Palestinians.

    記事の主な主張は何ですか？

Discussion Questions

  1. Do you think countries need to share values before they can cooperate closely?

    国どうしが緊密に協力するには、まず価値観を共有する必要があると思いますか？

  2. Was the UAE right to normalize relations with Israel before the Palestinian issue was resolved?

    パレスチナ問題が解決される前にイスラエルと国交を正常化したUAEの判断は正しかったですか？

  3. Can a smaller country successfully maintain good relations with two rival powers?

    小さな国は、対立する二つの大国とうまく良好な関係を保つことができますか？

  4. Does diplomatic access give the UAE more influence over Israel, or does normalization mainly benefit Israel?

    外交上のアクセスはUAEにイスラエルへのより大きな影響力を与えますか、それとも国交正常化は主にイスラエルに利益をもたらしますか？

  5. What is the difference between friendship and a pragmatic international partnership?

    友情と、現実的な国際協力関係の違いは何ですか？

Speaking Practice

Speak for about one minute about whether countries should cooperate with governments whose policies they strongly oppose.

国は、自らが強く反対する政策をとる政府と協力すべきかどうかについて、約1分間話してください。

Include:

  • one possible benefit of cooperation

    協力によって考えられる利益一つ

  • one moral or political risk

    道徳的または政治的なリスク一つ

  • whether direct communication can prevent conflict

    直接の対話が紛争を防げるかどうか

  • the UAE-Israel relationship as an example

    例としてのUAEとイスラエルの関係

  • your own conclusion

    あなた自身の結論